All's well that ends, well, soon.

My friend over at Agent Intellect pointed me to a book with a...controversial thesis. It's summed up nicely in the title: Better Not to Have Been - the Harm of Coming into Existence. I haven't read further than what's posted on the Amazon site, but it could be an interesting read when done with the dissertation. Not that I expect to agree with the author. But reading disagreeable arguments is important, as it shines a different light on things, so that we can see with a clarity we might not otherwise achieve.

From what I get out of the short reading sample, Prof. David Benatar is questioning some basic postulates about life and existence in general. The idea is that not existing is worse than existing. But murder and suicide are even worse than that, so we're stuck with doing the time. But we can do the world a favor by not having children, performing abortions wherever possible, and basically working towards total extinction of the human species. Actually, he doesn't stop with people: the more life we can take out, the better. So I think it would be most logical to eliminate plants too, even though they're not sentient: as long as life exists, it can evolve, and the potential for suffering remains.

Now I don't know anything about Prof. Benatar, who states flat out that he believes the case he's putting out for review. If he's got kids, it'll be hard to accept this claim - unless there are a lot of moments in his life like here. It's also hard to accept that he's essentially condemning the universe for making existence possible at all, not to mention any possible creator of the universe. But that's what he seems to be doing.

Aside from more direct questions pertaining to details of the argument, there are some other things I think would be worth addressing. Lest they be taken as irrelevant, I'll argue that if you're going to level such a heavy thesis as what's laid out in the book - and it is a supremely heavy charge - you can't blow off the attendant Big Questions that go along with it:

1. What if it really doesn't matter? The earth isn't going to last more than a few billion more years, meaning we'd better find another home quick. But if it turns out that there's no escape, there appears to be an upper limit to the number of future lives. And if the universe indeed simply ends, without anything beyond, there is no net gain or loss on a universal scale of goodness. So what would it matter if the actual total number of sentient beings were more or less than what it could be?
2. Do you know where we're going? If the universe evolved to the point where life and sentience appeared, and it seems to be moving in a certain direction - towards an end we know not what - it seems presumptuous to make the judgment call what that end is. (And it doesn't matter whether one holds a theistic or atheistic view: development has a direction, and there's always a certain range of possibilities for any outcome. So there seems to be an end implicit in the workings of the universe. I just don't think anyone's that far-sighted to see the ultimate telos.)
3. What grounds value and logic? To say this is overkill is to evade the issue, for the whole argument rides on a value judgment and reasoning. The anti-natal, pro-death argument supposes a certain value judgment; but the basis of value is by no means a settled issue. This means Prof. Benatar must not only justify the case on ethical grounds but also on axiological grounds. This theory of value must ground the argument itself and fit with the general logical theory, which itself carries a host of unresolved problems. In other words, the anti-natal, pro-death argument must be supported by a general theory of logic and value - and it must lead ultimately and inexorably to the thesis that existence in this world is worse than non-existence. Otherwise the argument is (at best) only a possible option, one among many.
   

There are more questions that need to be answered, but I'm just tired; let somebody else pose them.

Whoever thinks I'm treating Benatar's thesis lightly here is mistaken. I do find his conclusion repulsive, frankly, but I also see that repulsion alone is not a sufficient rebuttal. A counterargument is needed in order to meet the case on its own terms. In any case, people will vote with their feet, along with other body parts, so I don't see his argument persuading many folks. However, the philosophical discussion it stimulates make it worth considering.